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INTRODUCTION 
Rankings have turned into a dominant force in the context of higher education in 
general (Hazelkorn, 2011) and business schools in particular (Wedlin, 2006). A variety 
of rankings influence the field of management education including assessments of 
institutional research output (e.g., the UK’s Research Excellence Framework), journals 
(e.g., the UT Dallas’ journal list), and individuals’ research yield (e.g., ISI’s highly 
cited researcher lists). This paper is concerned with rankings of business school degree 
programs (e.g., the Financial Times Global MBA ranking or The Economist Which 
MBA? list). These widely disseminated measures of quality have been criticized from a 
variety of angles. Some scholars have argued that rankings are based on narrow and 
manipulable metrics (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Dichev, 1999), while others have 
emphasized that the ranks of the top schools are very stable over time creating path-
dependent effects (Devinney, Dowling & Perm-Ajchariyawong, 2008; Morgeson & 
Nahrgang, 2008). Business schools themselves complain about the significant amount 
of resources necessary to gather the data for the rankings, particularly as different 
publishers use different criteria (The Economist, 2002). In 2004, Harvard and Wharton 
even announced that they would no longer supply data to the relevant media agencies 
and would also not cooperate in contacting students and alumni to carry out the 
necessary surveys (Thompson, 2011). 
Despite these (and other) attempts to challenge the legitimacy of business school 
rankings, their importance has grown significantly. Few people would disagree that 
rankings are here to stay. As Wilson and McKiernan (2011: 462) point out: “Despite 
their failings, their ambiguity and their imprecision, business school rankings have 
become reified.” This points to an interesting puzzle: How can rankings maintain their 
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impact on the field of management education despite their contested nature? This paper 
addresses this question by discussing the conditions under which rankings are 
rationalized and become stable institutions that diffuse over time and space. Our 
analysis theorizes rankings as institutions (i.e., “enduring elements of social life”; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 216) and builds on knowledge in the literature on 
organizational institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In 
particular, we are addressing the discourse on institutional maintenance, as we are 
reflecting on those mechanisms that support rankings’ continued impact and relevance.   
So far, institutional theorists have explained the maintenance of rankings by 
pointing to the existence of isomorphic effects among business schools. Wedlin (2007), 
for instance, shows that schools adopt rankings to legitimize themselves and to be 
recognized as belonging to a group of like-minded organizations. Not much different, 
Corley and Gioia (2000) find that schools face strong pressures to ‘play the ranking 
game’ whether they like it or not. Underlying these explanations is the idea that schools 
respond to isomorphic pressures by complying with widely accepted standards for 
evaluating the quality of their degree programs. While this perspective helps us to better 
understand why rankings persist despite their widespread critique, they reflect field-
level analyses neglecting the role of the individual. In this paper we argue that rankings 
also maintain their status as prevalent institutions because they discipline individuals 
within business schools. We show that rankings’ disciplinary control stabilizes their 
impact and supports their further diffusion within the field of management education. 
We theorize the role of discipline by drawing on the work of Michel Foucault. 
Foucault’s notion of disciplinary control is not focused on direct control or even 
punishment. Rather discipline unfolds in a more subtle way; it is reflected in and 
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through social relations that rationalize and normalize individual and collective 
behavior (Foucault, 1978, 1980). Disciplinary control rests in human interaction and 
cannot be reduced to single individuals. Power is a practice of shaping relations among 
people and influencing the ‘way of being’ within organizations (Barker & Cheney, 
1994). Our argumentation follows a Foucauldian perspective for two reasons. First, 
Foucault’s (1978: 191) analysis of discipline emphasizes the role of the individual and 
its embeddedness in social relations. Conceptualizing institutional stability in this way 
helps us to move beyond the field-level perspective of existing work. Second, a 
Foucauldian perspective allows exploring how discipline acts as a productive force. 
Discipline defines what counts as ‘true’ knowledge and ‘normal’ behavior, while at the 
same time this knowledge also generates further disciplinary effects (Foucault, 1980: 
52). It is this productive interplay of knowledge and disciplinary power that helps us to 
explain the maintenance of business school rankings.  
Our main argument is that rankings discipline (a) by making individual’s 
performance visible according to a predefined set of metrics, (b) by homogenizing 
behavior and defining what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ within a given organizational 
context, and (c) by shaping how people understand themselves and the world around 
them. We suggest that these disciplinary mechanisms influence three key properties of 
rankings as institutions – i.e. their durability, reproducibility, and communicability. Our 
discussion shows that the influence of disciplinary control on these properties stabilizes 
rankings as institutions and helps to maintain their relevance on the wider field of 
management education.  
Our discussion contributes to and extends two scholarly discourses. First, we 
extend the literature on business school rankings (Dichev, 1999; Morgeson & 
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Nahrgang, 2008; Wedlin, 2011). Although scholars have pointed out that rankings are 
maintained because business schools operate in an uncertain and fragmented 
organizational environment and hence adopt rankings to increase their legitimacy 
(Corley & Gioia, 2000; Whitley, 1984), this perspective neglects the role of individuals 
in stabilizing and reproducing this institution across the field. Our analysis attempts to 
connect the well-established debate of macro-level institutions in management 
education (Meyer & Rowan, 2006) with the more recent emphasis on the individual 
subject (Vidaillet & Vignon, 2010). Second, we contribute to research on institutional 
theory by incorporating a Foucauldian perspective on disciplinary power into 
discussions of institutional maintenance. Such a perspective emphasizes the socially 
constructed nature of rationalized practices and complements the view that institutions 
are maintained through structural isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Our 
discussion shows that rankings’ disciplinary control creates objectifying and 
subjectifying effects that rationalize beliefs and practices and thus help to maintain 
institutions.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows. The next section sets the stage for our analysis 
by conceptualizing business school rankings as institutions which are embedded into the 
organizational field of management education. The following section introduces 
Foucault’s understanding of power and, based on that, discusses the various ways in 
which rankings discipline the behavior of individuals in business schools. The next 
section shows how these disciplinary effects help to maintain rankings as institutions by 
enhancing their stability within adopting organizations and supporting their further 
diffusion throughout the field. The last section discusses the implications of our analysis 
and introduces avenues for future research.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: RANKINGS AS INSTITUTIONS 
Institutions and Institutional Maintenance  
We define institutions in their broadest sense as “enduring elements in social life 
[…] that have a profound effect on the thoughts, feelings, and behaviour of individual 
and collective actors.” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 216) Institutions are embedded in 
organizational fields (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). Early institutional theorists have 
highlighted that such fields consist of the totality of relevant actors in an area of 
institutional life (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). Members of an 
organizational field share a common meaning system and, as a result, interact more 
frequently with one another (Scott, 1994). Other authors have adopted a more issue-
based definition emphasizing that the field itself results from dialog and negotiation 
among a diversity of actors around a contested issue (Hoffman, 1999; Zietsma & Winn, 
2005). According to this theoretical understanding, organizational fields are constituted 
in and through the exchanges of a variety of actors with disparate interests about the 
issue in question.  
The question of why institutions persist across time and diffuse across space has 
been addressed by the literature on institutional maintenance (Guler, Guillen & 
Macpherson, 2002; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Strang & Meyer, 1993). Institutional orders 
need to be maintained; they need to be recreated and supported on an ongoing basis in 
order to unfold their full effects. Although institutions by definition exercise social 
control over adopting organizations and hence are self-reproducing, it would be naïve to 
assume that institutions simply exist without any kind of maintenance (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). Early institutional theory conceptualized institutional maintenance 
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largely as structural isomorphism – institutions become stable and diffuse because a 
population of organizations faces coercive, mimetic or normative pressures (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). This bird’s eye view on maintenance was criticized for its neglect of 
the social and cognitive processes underlying the reproduction and diffusion of 
institutions (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000: 700).  
Linking maintenance to social and cognitive processes implies to adopt a social 
constructivist perspective. The social construction of rationalized beliefs can help to 
explain why some institutions gain a remarkable diffusion and visibility, while others 
fade away. Zilber (2010), for instance, adopts a discursive perspective and shows how 
the diffusion of narratives within an organization can help to stabilize institutions. 
Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) demonstrate how professional associations 
actively manage the creation of shared understandings in an organizational field leading 
to the maintenance of institutions (for a similar analysis see Quinn-Trank & 
Washington, 2009). The work by Angus (1993) focuses on how institutions are 
reproduced through public recognition of compliance shaping the continuous 
rationalization of beliefs and practices associated with institutions, while Zilber’s (2002) 
study shows that the social construction of institutional maintenance is influenced by 
routinizing the ongoing reproduction of members’ shared cognitive schemes.  
While this stream of literature has significantly advanced our understanding of 
how institutions are maintained over time and space, the role of disciplinary control in 
stabilizing and diffusing institutions remains undertheorized to date. Prior research has 
shown that institutions can be maintained through monitoring (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal 
& Hunt, 1998) and that control can also be exercised through the deliberate creation of 
barriers to institutional change (Holm, 1995). These analyses treat control largely as an 
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explicit and formalized organizational activity, but fail to account for the fact that 
control can also rest on power relations that are less visible and formalized (i.e. 
disciplinary control in a Foucauldian sense). One notable exception is the work by 
Townley (1997) who illustrates how disciplining effects are linked to the production of 
particular types of knowledge in organizations. While discipline has been recognized as 
one way to conceptualize institutional maintenance (Lawrence, 2008), it remains largely 
unclear how such control rationalizes practices as well as beliefs and hence embeds 
them into social contexts. Our analysis puts a particular focus on how disciplinary 
control creates objectifying and subjectifying effects by which organizational practices 
and beliefs are rationalized into widely recognized institutions (i.e. business school 
rankings) and, as a result, help to sustain these institutions over time and space.  
 
Business School Rankings as Institutions 
While business school rankings have traditionally shaped the North American 
higher education context (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), the rapid internationalization of the 
field of management education has made them equally relevant in other geographic 
regions (particularly Europe and recently also Asia). Nowadays, few deans would 
disregard the importance of the highly public rankings issued by the Financial Times 
(launched in 1999), BusinessWeek (launched in 2000), the Wall Street Journal 
(launched in 2001), and The Economist (launched in 2002). The growing 
homogenization of program offerings and the increasing international positioning of 
these programs reinforce the importance of rankings as ways to measure and compare 
their quality (Hazelkorn, 2011). Hence, it is hard to ignore that business school rankings 
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have turned into widely disseminated institutions reshaping the context of higher 
education (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004).  
Our emphasis on business school rankings as institutions stresses that the latter 
have developed into a stable and widely accepted phenomena in the context of 
management education. Understood in this way, rankings reflect “patterned higher-
order effects on the actions, indeed the constitution, of individuals and organizations 
without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to 
achieve these regularities.” (Clemens & Cook, 1999: 444-445) Rankings also reflect 
institutions in the sense that they are supported by a variety of organizational practices 
which control action outcomes. Rankings do not just exist in abstract disembodied 
ways, but they become objectified in administrative routines, documentations, 
numerical work, and, related to that, actors’ everyday behavior (McKinlay & Starkey, 
1998; Miller & O'Leary, 1987).  
Following Scott’s (1995) analysis of the elements of institutions, we suggest that 
rankings reflect an institution in three different ways. First, rankings contain regulative 
institutionalized elements, as they establish rules regarding ‘what counts’ when 
evaluating business schools and their programs (e.g., increase in graduates’ salaries). 
Although rankings do not directly monitor compliance, they specify a variety of metrics 
that business schools need to adhere to (for an overview see Table 1). Second, rankings 
contain normative institutionalized elements, because they create certain expectations 
within recipient organizations and thus help to define roles and the social obligations 
attached to them. Understood in this normative way, rankings determine what 
constitutes appropriate and therefore legitimate behavior within business schools. Last 
but not least, rankings also contain cultural-cognitive institutionalized elements, since 
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they shape common frames defining what is taken-for-granted and culturally supported 
within business schools. For instance, the belief that rankings play a crucial role for the 
future success of an organization is a deeply embedded belief (Dahlin-Brown, 2005). 
Together these three elements influence behavior and create stability and predictability 
of social life (Scott, 2003).  
 
================== 
Put Table 1 About Here  
================== 
 
We analyze rankings as one institution in the organizational field of management 
education. Various actors mutually influence each other in the context of this field, 
including, but not limited to: business schools, accreditation agencies, media outlets, 
government agencies, graduates, consultants, and potential employers. Although this 
field possesses a variety of shared patterns of meaning enabling stability and coherence 
of actions, many of the underlying issues remain contested and are subject to regular 
debate. For instance, the usefulness of one of the key degrees in management education, 
the MBA, has been continuously questioned (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005), while the 
practical relevance of business schools’ research output remains debated as well 
(Rasche & Behnam, 2009). Rankings are embedded into this contested field, while at 
the same time structuring the latter. Wedlin’s (2011) analysis shows that rankings are 
used as devices to build schools’ positions and legitimacy. Her study illustrates how 
rankings symbolically represent the structure of the field by ordering competing schools 
and thereby supporting the discursive construction of their legitimacy.  
Rankings face a variety of criticisms. Some scholars argue that rankings support a 
narrow view of science in the sense that the reputation of a school is measured by 
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faculty publications in a pre-selected list of, mostly North-American, journals (Adler & 
Harzing, 2009). Others have criticized rankings’ path-dependency. While the positions 
of early entrants remains almost unchanged over time, the positions of new entrants are 
very dynamic (Devinney et al., 2008). In a similar vein, Morgeson & Nahrgang (2008) 
find that schools’ positions in the BusinessWeek rankings remained almost unchanged 
over the years. There is also methodological critique arguing that rankings focus on 
isolated (and manipulable) aspects of school performance and hence do not reflect a 
good proxy measure for quality (Dichev, 1999). In 1998, the Financial Times’ first 
attempt to launch a business school ranking was so fiercely criticized that the ranking 
was withdrawn and relaunched a year later (Crainer & Dearlove, 1998). Some 
universities have even tried to form a coalition to jointly boycott the U.S. News and 
World Report rankings, however without much success (Lemann, 1998).  
This sustained critique begs the question of why business school rankings remain 
relevant despite their widespread critique? Of course, one straightforward answer to this 
question would be that the majority of actors in the field of management education 
desire rankings. In a world without rankings, business schools would lose an important 
source of legitimacy and differentiation (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Wedlin, 2011), while 
potential students and employers would give up an easily accessible measure of 
reputation and quality. In other words, schools aim to be ranked because they would not 
be perceived legitimate without a ranking. While this answer stresses institutional 
theory’s traditional focus on securing legitimacy, we approach this question by arguing 
that rankings unfold disciplinary control within business schools leading to stabilizing 
effects that reinforce their institutionalized character.   
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BUSINESS SCHOOL RANKINGS AS DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS: A 
FOUCAULDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Foucault and Disciplinary Power  
Foucault’s work has been the extensively discussed and applied in management 
studies (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998) affecting discourses like organization theory 
(Burrell, 1988), human resource management (HRM) (Townley, 1993), and business 
ethics (Crane, Knights & Starkey, 2008). While Foucault’s extensive body of work has 
given insights into a variety of phenomena ranging from the role of madness in Western 
history to a discussion of the history of sexuality, it is his conceptualization of power 
and control that has been most frequently discussed by management scholars. 
Townley’s (1993) analysis, for instance, shows how HRM creates disciplinary practices 
that ‘produce’ individuals within organizations. Her argument rests on the insight that 
HRM constitutes and produces knowledge in organizations and that this knowledge 
unfolds disciplining effects. Not much different, Sewell & Wilkinson (1992) show how 
just-in-time production systems discipline workers by making their work processes 
more visible. Our analysis builds upon these accounts, but also reaches beyond them 
insofar as we discuss the effect of disciplinary control on the maintenance of 
institutions.  
Foucault’s analyses are based on a particular understanding of power. Power is 
not simply introduced from the ‘outside’ and also not a property that can be possessed 
(Foucault, 1978: 176-177). Rather power unfolds through the day-to-day interactions 
among people; it functions as a ‘network of relations’. As Foucault remarks, “in 
thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary forms of 
existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches 
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their bodies, and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives.” (Foucault, 1980: 39) The individual body is both the 
“object and target of power.” (Foucault, 1978: 136) The body is understood to be 
‘analyzable’ and ‘manipulable’ in the sense that it can be trained and shaped through 
disciplinary practices. That is why Foucault talks about ‘docile bodies’ – bodies that are 
shaped through discipline. Discipline in this sense reflects one particular form of 
exercising power. It is not about controlling the entire body or even punishing it through 
enslavement, but to limit the body in terms of deeds, motions and attitudes (Downing, 
2008). This controlling of the body is not necessarily directly repressive. Foucault 
understands disciplinary power as a productive force making the body more useful in an 
economic sense (Foucault, 1978: 182-183). The subtle ways of disciplinary power aim 
at making the body more efficient and productive.  
 
Rankings as Disciplinary Institutions 
In his seminal work Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1978: 170-192) 
distinguishes three disciplinary techniques for creating docile bodies. We use these 
techniques as a yardstick to organize our analysis of how rankings produce disciplinary 
control over individuals in business schools.  
Hierarchical Observation through Rankings. The first technique, hierarchical 
observation, aims at organizing individuals in a way that they are constantly under 
surveillance thus making them more visible (Foucault, 1978: 170-177). Visibility (i.e. 
the knowledge of being watched) creates discipline. The point of hierarchical 
observation is not that there is constant direct surveillance of individuals, but that since 
people do not know whether they are observed, they behave as if they are being 
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watched (Downing, 2008). Observation in a Foucauldian sense is about self-policing 
rather than rigorous external monitoring. Hierarchical observation is not limited to 
physical observation, but also, and maybe most of all, includes observation through 
collecting and analyzing data about individual behavior (Giddens, 1985: 184; Miller & 
O'Leary, 1987: 239). Of course, rankings require business schools to do exactly that: to 
produce a significant amount of statistics about various aspects of performance (Wedlin, 
2006). For instance, the Financial Times Global MBA Ranking requires schools to 
generate information on different subject areas ranging from faculty research to the 
employment of graduates (Bradshaw, 2007). As most schools participate in different 
rankings simultaneously, producing such data on a regular basis becomes an important 
part of organizational life affecting almost all members of the organization. 
The availability and continuous production of data enables surveillance of 
individuals in two interrelated ways. First, as Espeland & Sauder (2009) remark, it 
makes schools’ reputation visible and gives the impression that their performance can 
be judged easily (even by non-expert audiences). Rankings are released on an annual or 
at least biannual basis and are swiftly disseminated via print media and the Internet. 
This high visibility creates disciplining effects. Individuals need to constantly work on 
improving their performance vis-à-vis a small set of indicators. Any drop in a ranking is 
easy to identify and usually paired with negative economic consequences which are 
likely to feed back to employees (e.g., decreased job security). As Foucault (1978: 175) 
remarks, this makes surveillance a “decisive economic operator”; a way of disciplining 
into higher performance and productivity. The disciplining effects associated with 
rankings’ visibility are hidden, as they rest on judgments by a network of constituents 
(e.g., potential students, employers, alumni). Because it is unclear what exactly rankings 
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measure – with opinions ranging from school performance (Dichev, 1999) and quality 
(Sauder & Espeland, 2006) to reputation  (Corley & Gioia, 2000) and customer 
satisfaction (Zemsky, 2008) – the visibility of a school’s rank contains a lot of 
interpretative flexibility making it attractive to a wide audience of ‘lay judges’.  
Second, rankings also increase the visibility of peoples’ performance within 
business schools. The systematic documentation and collection of data creates visibility 
around the performance of individuals (for a related discussion in the context of human 
resource management, see Townley, 1997). For instance, The Economist requires data 
on applicants’ GMAT scores enhancing transparency around the performance of 
program managers. BusinessWeek measures the effectiveness of a school’s alumni 
network making the performance of alumni officers’ very accessible. Such indicators 
objectify the performance of individuals and turn their attention to formerly neglected 
parts of everyday work life (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Because the individual as a 
subject becomes socially constructed as an object of knowledge, its intra-organizational 
visibility increases significantly. How someone contributes towards a school’s position 
in a ranking becomes visible. As Foucault (1978) argues, this visibility does not imply 
direct supervision. Rather it produces self-monitoring behavior, since actors know that 
their performance is visible vis-à-vis the indicators specified by rankings. Such self-
monitoring objectifies the individual because it makes people internalize an observer’s 
perspective as a primary view on their selves.  
Normalizing Judgment through Rankings. Foucault’s second disciplinary 
technique, normalizing judgment, disciplines behavior by defining what is commonly 
perceived to be ‘normal’. As Foucault (1978: 182) remarks, “it refers individual actions 
to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the 
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principle of a rule to be followed.” Normalizing judgment homogenizes behavior 
(because it demands conformity), but also defines the ‘abnormal’ and hence uncovers 
differences between peoples’ performance (because it allows to assess gaps). Rankings 
normalize individual behavior by creating dichotomies through which we classify the 
‘normal’ and exclude what is ‘abnormal’. The different ranking criteria act as a guide in 
this context. For instance, it becomes normal to employ faculty with PhDs (one of the 
measures for faculty quality by The Economist), to focus on directly applicable 
knowledge (one of the items included by the Wall Street Journal), and to consider 
average industry salaries when placing students (as alumni salaries are measured by the 
Financial Times). This is not to say that schools would neglect these (and other) issues 
if rankings were non-existent. Rather it suggests that rankings help to create an 
“artificial order” (Foucault, 1978: 179) within business schools; an order which defines 
categories of knowledge that become self-justifying (Barker & Cheney, 1994). 
The normalization process underlying rankings has a corrective function. It allows 
identifying gaps, since it fixes references points for individual and collective 
sensemaking. These reference points are perceived as constraints and allow for judging 
non-observance; they form the basis for comparing, differentiating and hierarchizing 
individuals. As Foucault (1978: 180) remarks:  
 
“We have a distribution between a positive pole and a negative pole; all 
behaviour falls in the field between good and bad marks, good and bad points. 
Moreover, it is possible to quantify this field and work out an arithmetical 
economy based on it.” (our emphasis)  
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The quantification of relevant information supports normalizing judgment, as it enables 
people to distinguish much quicker between the normal and the abnormal. Information 
on business schools’ performance is not by definition quantitative. Rankings convert 
qualitative into quantitative information, a practice that is referred to as 
commensuration. Commensuration simplifies by decontextualizing and depersonalizing 
knowledge as well as neglecting significant amounts of information (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007; Espeland & Stevens, 1998). However, commensuration also increases the 
perceived authority of information because it absorbs some of the ambiguity that is 
attached to qualitative data (March & Olsen, 1976). This mixture of simplified, yet 
authoritative, information supports the corrective function of normalizing judgment: (a) 
it directs attention to a few selected issues making the comparison of performance and 
the identification of gaps much easier (because other facets of performance are deemed 
irrelevant) and (b) it makes longitudinal assessments of normalized behavior much 
easier (as measures are stable and comparable). The reduction of semantic richness 
through quantification reinforces rankings’ disciplinary control by making people 
fearful of the humiliating and easily identifiable effects of non-observant behavior. 
Examination through Rankings. Examination combines the two prior 
techniques and reflects the regular observation of normalization. Examination is a 
ritualized technique ensuring that individuals are frequently overlooked and graded. 
Foucault (1978: 184-185) argues that examinations help to establish knowledge and 
consequently a ‘truth’ about individuals; they objectify individuals by imposing power 
and knowledge relations upon them and by situating them into a network of 
documentation and writing (Foucault, 1978: 189). Rankings do not examine in the sense 
of physically auditing individual behavior, but they force schools to regularly produce 
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documents (e.g., about research performance, faculty quality, incoming class features) 
which fix and capture the subject. The creation of such documents makes it possible “to 
classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms” (Foucault, 1978: 190) 
and hence turn individual subjects into analyzable and comparable objects. 
To examine via documentation makes each individual a ‘case’; it exposes the 
particularities of individuals and shows the need for further training, correction, and 
normalization (Schwan & Shapiro, 2011). Understanding rankings as examinations 
shows Foucault’s understanding of the interplay of knowledge and power: rankings 
establish knowledge about subjects and by doing so also control their behavior. For 
Foucault (1978: 188-189) examinations are deeply woven into the organization. 
Subjects do not directly feel or see the exam; they only feel and reflect on its effects. 
Examinations constitute the individual as an object, but also, at the same time, affect 
how individuals constitute themselves. Discipline does not make individuals passive 
objects but influences their self-understanding and identity construction (Heller, 1996; 
Rabinow, 1991); a process “by which we assert ‘who we are’” (Barker & Cheney, 1994: 
28).  
While some authors have claimed that rankings act as templates for shaping the 
organizational identity of business schools (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Wedlin, 2006), a 
Foucauldian analysis emphasizes that rankings also shape how individuals understand 
themselves and their work. Individuals experience the effects of the documentation 
produced by rankings (e.g., in terms of rewards or punishments). These effects steer 
processes of self-reflection creating identities like ‘top researcher’, ‘valued teacher’, and 
‘successful program manager’. Although the subject in a Foucauldian sense is 
decentered and embedded into a network of power relations, it is still active in processes 
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of self-formation. Subjectivity is formed as a product of actors’ exposure to and 
engagement in multiple normalized practices that make the individual observable. 
(Zembylas, 2003) 
Taken together, the three disciplinary mechanisms show how rankings establish 
disciplinary control over individuals. All mechanisms discipline by objectifying the 
individual – subjects are turned into objects appearing to be analyzable independent of 
their agency. Hierarchical observation objectifies the individual by enhancing her/his 
visibility within the organization. This acculturates people to adopt an observer’s 
perspective on their own behavior separating them from others. Normalizing judgment 
objectifies the individual by creating categories into which people can be classified. 
Examination objectifies the individual by transcribing peoples’ features into 
documentation. The resulting depersonalization makes the individual an analyzable 
object and influences processes of self-formation. The analysis up to this point is 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
================== 
Put Table 2 About Here  
================== 
 
DISCIPLINARY CONTROL AS INSTITUTIONAL MAINTENANCE 
We now argue that the disciplinary control exercised by rankings affects their 
diffusion across time and space. We suggest that disciplinary control has an impact on 
rankings’ durability, reproducibility, and communicability – three properties of 
institutions which shape the stability and diffusion of rationalized beliefs and practices 
(Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000).  
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Durability: Maintaining Rankings through Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
Durability is about the enduring nature of an institution; its ability to survive over 
time despite being challenged (Clemens & Cook, 1999). Our analysis frames rankings’ 
durability as resting on self-fulfilling prophecies shaped by disciplinary control.  
Rankings’ influence on subjectification processes aligns the self-understanding of 
actors with ranking criteria. This altered self-understanding shapes the cognitive 
schemes of individuals and helping them to suppress alternative interpretations of these 
criteria. Gill (2009), for instance, shows how researchers change their points of 
reference for sensemaking when confronted with pressures to respond to narrowly 
defined research and teaching expectations. If actors alter the way they understand 
themselves and their work, they reproduce the assumptions embedded in rankings and, 
as a result, make rankings more durable. Here, the durability of rankings rests on a self-
fulfilling prophecy: rankings are durable because what rankings measure influences 
peoples’ self-understanding (and hence the behavioral norms they respond to) which in 
turn justifies the measures (see also the discussion by Espeland & Sauder, 2007). This 
constitution of actors stabilizes rankings within business schools and creates barriers to 
change. For instance, if student employability is understood in terms of ‘value for 
money’ (e.g., measured by salary increases), then this particular conception of 
employability is regarded as relevant and justified. The durability of such self-fulfilling 
prophecies is hard to challenge, as people conceive of themselves as reacting to the 
measures, whereas in fact they are enacting them (Weick, 1979).  
Rankings’ durability is also enhanced by the disciplining nature of the visibility 
they create. Since rankings introduce metrics into business schools that make people 
comparable, it is easier to distinguish between high and low performers. One possible 
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consequence is that management will raise its expectations regarding high performers, 
while low performers are seen to have little potential. Framing expectations in this way 
can create a self-fulfilling prophecy (Eden, 1984): raising expectations regarding high 
performers often enhances their performance. This model of self-fulfilling prophecy has 
been described as the Pygmalion effect (Livingston, 2003) and rests on internalized 
changes in self-expectancy (e.g., influencing motivation) and supervisor expectancy 
(e.g., influencing leadership style). The Pygmalion effect strengthens the durable nature 
of rankings, as those employees who are aligned with ranking criteria are more likely to 
be promoted/rewarded, while underperforming employees are likely to leave the 
organization. The Pygmalion effect reflects a self-selection mechanism that stabilizes 
the role of rankings within business schools.  
The disciplining effects of commensuration also enhance rankings’ durability. 
The metrics produced by commensurative practices create barriers to alternative 
interpretations of ranking criteria. Codified metrics often act as a source for redesigning 
existing organizational practices (e.g., reward systems and selection/promotion 
processes). Redesigning these practices can create another self-fulfilling prophecy: the 
more such practices are aligned with the metrics propagated by rankings, the more 
people will enact these metrics over time (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). For 
instance, aligning reward systems with ranking criteria by focusing on specific metrics 
justifies these metrics and inscribes rankings into important organizational practices. 
This increases the durability of rankings’ effects, since challenging the ranking would 
imply to challenge fundamental organizational processes underlying the operation of 
business schools.  
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Reproducibility: Maintaining Rankings through Enacted Codifications 
While durability explains rankings’ stability within business schools, 
reproducibility and communicability help to understand institutional maintenance at the 
field level. Reproducibility refers to “the capacity to reproduce a rationalized pattern or 
package in quasi-identical form and enact the relationships it implicates.” (Hasselbladh 
& Kallinikos, 2000: 709) The reproducibility of an institution largely depends on how 
clearly its underlying rules are specified. Rankings rest on highly specified rules, as they 
discipline through commensurative practices producing aggregated numbers. This 
formal codification decontextualizes rankings and makes them easily reproducible (as 
metrics can be enacted quickly in different contexts). For instance, it is easier to 
reproduce the metric ‘average GMAT score’ than to reflect on applicants’ quality 
through a narrative account.  
It is important to understand that it is not the mere existence of metrics that 
enables rankings’ reproducibility across time and space. Rather it is the enactment of 
these metrics and their belonging social relationships that diffuses rankings as 
institutions. Simply reproducing the metric in a different context is not sufficient, as 
rankings need to be sufficiently embedded into new organizational settings in order for 
them to be reproduced. It is the disciplining character attached to commensuration that 
enables the enactment of rankings within business schools and their successful 
reproduction throughout the field of management education. Commensuration directs 
peoples’ attention to what is considered to be ‘normal’ helping them to enact their own 
organizational reality (Weick, 1995). Rankings reproduce because the disciplinary 
control attached to their commensurative mechanisms helps to quickly embed them into 
different organizational context (see also Giddens, 1985 on disembedding mechanisms). 
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Communicability: Maintaining Rankings through Discourse 
We understand communicability as reflecting “how easily a rationalized package 
can cross an organizational field, be understood and conveyed to others than those 
involved in its conception, construction, and initial use.” (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 
2000: 710) Communicability is about expressing the key features of rankings in a way 
that new adopters can easily connect to its basic pillars. We argue that rankings’ 
disciplinary features shape the discourse on management education at the field level and 
thus enhance the communicability of this institution. In particular, commensuration and 
subjectification homogenize what language people from ranked schools use. Faced with 
a set of homogenized metrics, people start to use comparable terminology to discuss 
similar issues. Wedlin (2011), for instance, shows that rankings helped to construct a 
‘customer perspective’ throughout ranked schools on both sides of the Atlantic. Of 
course, changes in field-level discourses are also influenced by how people understand 
themselves and their work. For example, if scholars see themselves as ‘high performing 
researchers’ based on the criteria defined by rankings, this particular way of self-
understanding is likely to diffuse throughout the community of ranked schools (for a 
discussion of how language shapes the diffusion of institutions see Fiss & Hirsch, 
2005).  
As management education reflects a field with a high density, because people 
from ranked and non-ranked schools are connected and communicate in a variety of 
ways (Sahlin-Andersson & Engwell, 2002), the homogenized discourse created among 
ranked schools is likely to spill over into the wider discourse on management education. 
Rankings significantly influence the language actors from ranked and non-ranked 
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schools use to describe/compare/benchmark the main features of their field. As a result, 
organizations interested in ‘playing the ranking game’ can relate much better to the 
‘rules of the game’ (Corley & Gioia, 2000), as the latter are expressed in rather 
mundane terms resting on established significations and meaning structures. This 
enhanced communicability makes it easier to frame the adoption of rankings as an 
opportunity (rather than a threat) influencing the diffusion of the institution within the 
organizational field.  
 
IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This paper has argued that rankings are able to maintain their status as a widely 
acknowledged institution because of the disciplinary effects they unfold within business 
schools. These disciplinary effects make the impact of rankings on schools more 
durable, while also enhancing their reproducibility and communicability. Taken 
together, our arguments show the significance of acknowledging the impact of micro-
organizational behavior on institutional maintenance. Of course, rankings also maintain 
their status as institutions because business schools engage in mimetic isomorphism 
adopting rankings to increase their legitimacy vis-à-vis competitors. By contrast, 
explaining institutional maintenance through disciplinary control emphasizes the role of 
the ‘governed individual’ in stabilizing and diffusing institutions. Our analysis shows 
the usefulness of such a micro perspective on maintenance, and we conclude by 
outlining three implications of our discussion for future research.  
First, there is need to better understand the socially constructed nature of 
rankings’ maintenance. Rankings cannot be viewed in separation from the 
organizational realities they try to portray. In fact, their effects are shaped by the very 
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reality they are attempting to represent. Discipline is a powerful force to structure this 
reality because it influences the enactment of behavioral norms within schools. 
Understanding rankings in terms of discipline makes us aware that individuals create 
many of the opportunities and constraints they subsequently experience as ‘given’. 
Rankings may appear as hard facts representing business schools’ organizational reality, 
whereas in fact a school’s position within a ranking is influenced by how and in which 
ways disciplinary control unfolds.  
As schools are likely to show differences in terms of hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgment and examination, our framework can help to explain variation 
among adopters in responding to rankings (see also the discussion by Corley & Gioia, 
2000; Espeland & Sauder, 2007). Analytically distinguishing disciplinary mechanisms 
from their effects is important, since discipline does not necessarily result in 
unquestioned obedience. For instance, it is possible that discipline results in avoidance 
or manipulation, particularly when the self-perception of an organization does not 
match with its position in a ranking (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). Future research needs to 
identify variations in responses to rankings by differentiating the conditions that 
influence how discipline unfolds in different organizations, for instance by referring to 
Oliver’s (1991) framework of responses to institutional pressures. As variations in 
responses are largely invisible to those using rankings, there is a significant degree of 
uncertainty attached to schools’ ranks.  
A second implication of our analysis regards the role of the subject. As discussed, 
the disciplinary control exercised by rankings helps to objectify the subject within 
business schools. Rankings turn the individual into an analyzable object that can be 
compared/benchmarked/managed. Such objectifications bring about a transition of 
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emphasis from the individual subject (with its unique experiences, capabilities, and 
idiosyncratic character) to the decontextualized role. Organizational duties become 
decoupled from the individuality of persons and are transformed into predefined roles 
that can be assigned to different members of a collectivity, as long as people can fulfill 
the criteria associated with the role (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). For instance, 
rankings have helped to decontextualize the role of the researcher by defining good 
scholarship largely through where and how often scholars publish (rather than what they 
publish). This makes researchers easier to replace as role specifications depend on a 
selection of widely diffused criteria rather than assessments of an individual’s fit with 
the organization. In this sense, rankings’ communicability enhances the diffusion of role 
definitions throughout the field. Unfortunately, current research has detached the 
discussion of rankings from the role of individuals working in business schools. Future 
research needs to investigate how rankings help to transform the individuality of 
persons into predefined roles. This requires bridging the macro-micro divide by 
investigating how the diffusion of rankings within the field helps to define a ‘template’ 
for developing role definitions. 
A third implication concerns the moral dimension of rankings, which, 
unfortunately, has remained largely neglected to date. A Foucauldian (1979) perspective 
emphasizes that disciplinary control is productive – discipline emerges as an effect of 
knowledge (while also influencing the latter). As Foucault (1978: 194) writes in 
Discipline and Punish: “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth.” The discipline exercised by rankings produces 
organizational roles and tasks, performance measures (and their belonging 
documentations), and influences individuals’ self-understanding. These changes create a 
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variety of, often unintended, yet enduring effects, including changes in resource 
allocation to maximize compliance and peoples’ status within organizational 
hierarchies. By standardizing, comparing and observing behavior, rankings create 
winners and losers, both on an organizational as well as individual level. While research 
has shown that rankings help to define an ‘elite’ among business schools (Wedlin, 
2007), the intra-organizational effects on the individual are less clear. For instance, 
Gill’s (2009) analysis shows that rankings can create fear, anxiety, shame, and feelings 
of out-of-placeness. On the one hand, such reactions internalize rankings into everyday 
work routines fostering organizational change. On the other hand, such responses raise a 
variety of ethical challenges: Do rankings create unjustified inequality, both among 
business schools and their staff? Do rankings call for moral compromises (e.g., between 
‘playing the game’ and remain true to oneself)? Answering questions like these would 
improve our knowledge about business school rankings in significant ways.  
Understanding and theorizing rankings’ continued relevance to the field of 
management education as resting on disciplinary control implies a shift in emphasis. 
Rankings not only ‘matter’ because they provide business schools with an important 
and highly visible source of legitimacy (Dahlin-Brown, 2005), but also because they 
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Table 1 –Selected Criteria Used by Major International Rankings 
 
 




The Economist • salary change (pre-MBA to 
post-MBA)/ salary 
• percentage of graduates in 
new jobs after graduation 
• percentage of graduates with 
jobs through career service 
• average GMAT score 
• average length of work 
experience 
• percentage of women 
students 
• ratio of registered alumni to 
current students 
• student rating of programme 
content  
• number of overseas 
countries with alumni 
• percentage of faculty with 
PhDs 
BusinessWeek 
(Global Full-Time MBA) 
• effectiveness of career 
services 
• usefulness of skills  
• usefulness of networks 
• value for money  
• contacts to businesses 
• ‘caliber’ of class  • teaching quality  
• teaching material 
• work load  
• technological tools  
• intellectual capital score 
(calculated based on 
publications in a list of 20 
journals)  
Wall Street Journal • recruitment experience  
• value for money of 
recruitment effort  
• skills and abilities of 
graduates  
• likelihood of recruiter return 
• student characteristics  • career services office 
• overall satisfaction with a 
school 
• faculty expertise  
 
Financial Times 
(Global Full-Time MBA)  
• salary change (pre-MBA to 
post-MBA)/ post-MBA 
salary 
• graduates employed within 
three months time  
• value for money (incl. fees 
vs. salary and length)  
• gender diversity of incoming 
students  
• international diversity of 
students 
• gender diversity of faculty  
• international diversity of 
faculty  
• international exposure 
during the program  
• percentage of papers in 45 
journals within three years 
time  
• percentage of faculty with 
PhDs 
• number of doctoral 
graduates over three years 
Note: This overview does not reflect a complete list of all ranking criteria. Note that some of the publishers do not publicly display their exact ranking criteria, but only refer 
to general categories (e.g., ‘effectiveness of career services’). The table is based on the criteria reported by the different publishers on their respective websites as well as data 


































Subjectification Individual (through  
altered self-
understanding) 
 
